The fall of the Syrian regime was not limited to Iran losing the only country considered its ally within the so-called axis of resistance, which is based primarily on militias in the region, some of which it created and others that were already present. It seems that the effects of Bashar al-Assad's fall will go far beyond the loss of an ally due to Tehran's fear of its repercussions. It will likely lead to a new regional strategy to compensate for Iran's loss of Syria as a regional ally, which raises questions about Iran's current weakness.

The effects may extend to a new stage that will likely witness regional competition and perhaps tensions between Iran and its historical rival, Turkey. The dilemma that Tehran is experiencing is embodied by the recent confusion in the statements of Iranian officials, starting with the Supreme Leader and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi. This contrasts with what the President's Advisor for Strategic Affairs, Javad Zarif, proposed and called the "Initiative of Amity for the Countries of West Asia." Iranian fears of the repercussions of the fall of Bashar al-Assad, internally and externally, can be summarised as follows:

Criticisms of Iran

First, internal fear seems to be prevailing in Iran even though Tehran criticised the Assad regime after its fall and considered it responsible for what happened over 14 years. This internal fear is also dominant, although Bashar al-Assad did not listen to the advice of its officials to get closer to its people. The deteriorating economic situation caused it to lose the support of the army, in which corruption was widespread due to low salaries.

Iranian officials promote and analyze and media outlets address the argument that Tehran advised Assad to carry out political reforms, activate the constitutional amendment committee, and hold a safe dialogue with the opposition. Assad did not accept change, however.

These criticisms of Bashar al-Assad are the same ones that Iran suffers from, whether in terms of poverty rates, the economic crisis, or the separation between the people and the existing regime.

This may warn the Iranian regime that it is weak and will not find a popular base to protect it. Perhaps the only difference between the Tehran regime and the al-Assad one is Iran's continued grip on the security and military institutions that guarantee its internal security.

Second: The confusion of Iranian diplomacy towards the new Syria. After the fall of al-Assad, the Iranian Foreign Ministry statement was classical and traditional, affirming support for the Syrian people's choices and the unity of their territories and distancing itself from al-Assad. Araghchi also confirmed communication with the new administration. During a conference for representatives of the Iranian Supreme Leader in military institutions, Araghchi called for diplomacy as the best way to affirm collaboration.

What is meant here is diplomacy alongside the military movement, which is based on supporting the militias in the region and activating the military face of the Iranian Foreign Ministry. In Syria, Araghchi said: "It is too early to judge now, as there are many influential factors that will determine the future of this country."

These statements were understood to mean that Iran is moving in Syria in a way that creates chaos by mobilising sleeper cells or forming new sectarian militias or using the remnants of the Syrian security services. Therefore, the leaders of the new administration in Syria responded in a way that warned Iran against trying to create chaos in Syria, and Ahmed al-Sharaa, head of the Syrian regime, criticized the role that Iran has played in Syria over the past years.

These statements reflected the tensions between Tehran and the new Syrian administration. Statements also denied the existence of contacts between the two parties and that the opening of the Iranian embassy in Syria is not expected soon.

In parallel with these tensions that came to the surface a few days ago, Zarif came out with an article in "The Economist" in which he spoke about a regional initiative called " Initiative of Amity for the Countries of West Asia." This initiative calls on all influential Islamic countries in West Asia, such as Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the future governments in Syria, Turkey, the UAE and Yemen, to participate in comprehensive negotiations.

Third: Syria was not only an arena for the Iranian-Israeli conflict but was also witness to Iranian-Turkish competition or disputes and attempts to extend influence in the future.

A few weeks after the fall of Bashar al-Assad's government, there were Turkish statements criticising Iran's behavior in Syria. The Turkish government did not hide that it is the main supporter of the Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham group, which is leading Syria and is therefore sensitive to Syria's stability and success.

‍

Photo: The effects may extend to a new stage that will likely witness regional competition and perhaps tensions between Iran and its historical rival, Turkey. (by Adobe).