US President Donald Trump is attempting to deal with the Ansar Allah Group (known as the Houthis) with a policy different from that pursued by his predecessor, Joe Biden, in terms of the strength, intensity, and severity of the attacks on the Houthis in Yemen.
Yemen, with its strategic location and proximity to an international waterway such as the Bab al-Mandab Strait, represents an opportunity for Iran to strengthen its relationship with the Houthi group and invest in supporting them politically and militarily, thus supporting them in their bid to seize power.
Since the US invasion of Iraq, which provided Iran with opportunities to expand its influence by exploiting the sectarian dimension in many countries in the region, Yemen has continued with this strategy. Tehran has worked to consolidate its relationship with the Houthis.
This relationship with Iran and the Houthis? began in the 1990s, but it strengthened with the growing Iranian tendency to empower Shiites in the region after 2003, making it one of its soft power tools in foreign policy. Iran's relationship with the Houthis has given it access to the southwestern coast of the Arabian Peninsula, particularly as a threat at the Bab al-Mandab Strait, a chokepoint as a major transit area for trade, with between 60 and 70 ships passing through it daily. Over time, Iran has attempted to reproduce the Lebanese Hezbollah model in Yemen, supporting it to share power with other forces and parties and then monopolising it.
Yemen does not represent a security interest or strategic priority for Iran, but its intervention in Yemen, with its destabilising effects, was an opportunity for Tehran to gain additional advantage against Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, especially given that Yemen shares borders with these countries. The failure of the political transition and the Houthi rebellion provided an opportunity for Iran's influence in Yemen to grow, counterbalancing Saudi Arabia, which opposes Iranian behaviour in the Levant.
After Operation "Al-Aqsa Flood", the Houthis' attacks on ships in international shipping lanes such as the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab provided a new advantage for the Houthis, which Iran has employed to pressure the international community, rather than the usual Iranian way of threatening the security of shipping in the Arabian Gulf.
This situation has given the Houthis a sense of strength as a regional actor whose influence extends beyond Yemen, and has created ambitions for them to play a role similar to that of Lebanese Hezbollah. Two years ago, the Middle East witnessed Israeli military force aimed at clipping Iran's wings by eliminating its regional affiliates, such as Hezbollah and Hamas, and striking military targets inside Iran itself. It also threatened to strike Iraqi militias in the event of intervention, in addition to toppling Iran's most important ally, the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syia.
Despite the above, the Houthis were not subjected to the military force that would have eliminated their military and leadership capabilities and prevented their growing threat to maritime navigation during the Gaza War. Quite the opposite, Hezbollah's role has shifted to the Houthis, with their presence in Iraq increasing and their use of special training camps.
Today, US President Donald Trump is attempting to deal with the Houthis with a policy different from that of his predecessor. The strength, intensity, and severity of the attacks demonstrate a shift from merely limiting and weakening their capabilities, indicating that Trump intends to change the security landscape that has characterised the Middle East over the past two years. This coincides with Trump's messages to Iran urging them to conclude an agreement with him, using language based on both incentives and threats of military force.
The Houthis' military strength has been demonstrated by their reliance on outdated and primitive weapons, relying on guerrilla warfare tactics and asymmetric warfare, known as "hybrid warfare." They have completely changed the rules of the game by employing ballistic missiles and drones, shifting from a defensive to an offensive posture. The Houthis have used the Toophan ballistic missile, similar to the Iranian Ghadr missile, which has a range of over 1,600 kilometers, to demonstrate their ability to reach targets far beyond Yemen.
Iran has supported the Houthis on several levels, through military support, training, financial resources, military equipment, and intelligence. As usual, Iran has denied any involvement in the Houthis' behaviour.
Therefore, the question that will be answered in the coming days is: will the Houthis withstand the increasing international pressure to restore security to global shipping routes? To what extent will Iran's response to Trump's message impact the changing security landscape, whether through attacks on the Houthis or Israel's resumption of the war in Gaza and violation of the ceasefire agreement?