The campaign of the new Iranian president, Masoud Pezeshkian, was based on re-engaging with the West to avoid sanctions and ease strict dress codes for women. Iran's elections in late June have also shown the division between conservative factions, whose votes were divided between the two main conservative candidates. At the time, the conservatives were unable to agree on a single candidate in the first round of the election.

Pezeshkian is the first reformist president Iran has had in nearly two decades. He won the election with 53.6 percent of the vote, defeating hardline conservative Saeed Jalili in the runoff by 2.8 million votes.

The question now is no longer whether it is possible to change Iran's domestic and foreign policies under a reformist president. The more important one in this context is why the Iranian Supreme Leader and his security and military establishment allowed a reformist president to come to power after all these years.

Internal reasons pushed a reformist president to power

There were primarily internal reasons that pushed a reformist president to power. The election was called after the sudden death of former President Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash in May. Pezeshkian campaigned on re-engaging with the West to ease sanctions by reviving the nuclear deal and easing strict dress codes for women. Turnout in the runoff was 50 percent, a marked improvement from the low levels of the first round.

The election also revealed the divisions among Iran's conservative factions, whose votes were split between the two main conservative candidates. The conservatives were unable to agree on a single candidate in the first round.

In the runoff, Jalili won 13.5 million votes to Pezeshkian's 16.4 million, reflecting the growing polarisation of the political system and discontent among both hardliners and conservatives with the regime.

One of the reasons Khamenei allowed a reformist candidate to run was because he was concerned about the hardliners, who themselves were competing with each other among their various factions.

Another reason is the fear that the reformists will turn into an opposition party. The third reason is the fear of the return of popular protests similar to those of 2017, 2019, 2022 and 2023. Over the past years, Iran has seen movements for several reasons during the terms of Hassan Rouhani and Ebrahim Raisi. The revolutionary movement has its social and cultural repercussions, as well as the exacerbation of economic problems.

Iran also witnessed the nationwide demonstrations led by women that erupted in 2022. There have also been  ethnic nationalist uprisings in the provinces of Kurdistan, Sistan, and Baluchistan, and unrest among workers and employees due to low wages, salaries and high inflation. These demonstrations were the nucleus of the revolutionary movement and the emergence of political forces that reject the Supreme Leader and the regime.

But the reformists have paid the price. The movement has been marginalised, and the suppression of civil liberties and the pursuit of a reactionary agenda around the policies of social reproduction and population control.

There was then a general perception within Iran that the hardliners were no longer capable of running the government or improving the economic, social and political conditions. That is why the reformists' return to power was a factor that shielded the Iranian Supreme Leader from the citizens' criticism of him regarding the deterioration of the economic conditions or mismanagement.

As for the most important challenge facing Pezeshkian, it is his ability to exercise his influence in the face of the hardliners in the regime, while the Supreme Leader enjoys absolute power. With the structural contradictions facing Iran, Pezeshkian may not be able, despite his promises, to overcome the basic economic challenges that cause inflation and the decline in living standards.

At the level of foreign policy, whose authority is completely in the hands of the Supreme Leader, the security establishment and the Revolutionary Guards, it is unlikely to change, especially the regional policy that is based on a network of regional agents. This regional policy has become a major part of Iran's strategy and achieves its national interests and protects its security in the face of Israel and the United States.

Therefore, the general discontent of the citizens remains. This was reflected in the lowest percentage of voting in the elections that Iran has witnessed in recent years.

Photo: Kashan Imamzadeh mosque in Iran (by Adobe)